‘Unwilling’ versus ‘unable’: Tonkean macaques’ understanding of human goal-directed actions by Canteloup, Charlotte & Meunier, Hélène
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2017
‘Unwilling’ versus ‘unable’: Tonkean macaques’ understanding of human
goal-directed actions
Canteloup, Charlotte; Meunier, Hélène
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7717/peerj.3227
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-140892
Published Version
Originally published at:
Canteloup, Charlotte; Meunier, Hélène (2017). ‘Unwilling’ versus ‘unable’: Tonkean macaques’ under-
standing of human goal-directed actions. PeerJ, 5:e3227.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7717/peerj.3227
Submitted 5 January 2017
Accepted 24 March 2017
Published 3 May 2017
Corresponding author
Charlotte Canteloup,
charlotte.canteloup@gmail.com
Academic editor
Luciano Fadiga
Additional Information and
Declarations can be found on
page 14
DOI 10.7717/peerj.3227
Copyright
2017 Canteloup and Meunier
Distributed under
Creative Commons CC-BY 4.0
OPEN ACCESS
‘Unwilling’ versus ‘unable’: Tonkean
macaques’ understanding of human
goal-directed actions
Charlotte Canteloup1,2,3,4,5 and Hélène Meunier1,2,3,4
1Centre de Primatologie de l’Université de Strasbourg, Niederhausbergen, France
2Université de Strasbourg—Laboratoire de Neurosciences Cognitives et Adaptatives, Strasbourg, France
3CNRS—Laboratoire de Neurosciences Cognitives et Adaptatives, UMR 7364, Strasbourg, France
4University of Strasbourg Institute for Advanced Study, Strasbourg, France
5Anthropological Institute and Museum, University of Zürich, Zürich, Switzerland
ABSTRACT
The present study investigated the understanding of goal-directed actions in Tonkean
macaques (Macaca tonkeana) using the unwilling versus unable paradigm, previously
used in several species. Subjects were tested in three experimental conditions that
varied according to the goal-directed actions of a human actor. In the ‘‘unwilling’’
condition, the actor was capable of giving the subject food but unwilling to do it;
in the ‘‘unable’’ condition, she was willing to give food but was unable to do it
because of a physical barrier; and in the ‘‘distracted’’ condition, she was occupied
by manipulating a pebble instead of food. We report for the first time that Tonkean
macaques, like capuchins, chimpanzees and human infants, behaved differently across
these experimental conditions. They attempted to grasp food in the actor’s hand
significantly more and displayed more threats in the presence of an unwilling actor
rather than an unable or a distracted one. Inversely, they begged significantly more
and displayed more frustration behaviors facing a distracted and unable experimenter
rather than an unwilling one. These results suggest that Tonkean macaques understand
human goal-directed actions by predicting whether they were likely to obtain food
merely based on movements, cue and motor intentions reading and understanding of
physical constraints.
Subjects Animal Behavior, Evolutionary Studies, Neuroscience, Zoology
Keywords Goal-directed action, Intentions, Theory of mind, Mindreading, Behavior-reading,
Macaca tonkeana
INTRODUCTION
The perception of others as intentional agents is essential in human daily life and
development. We attribute thoughts, beliefs and intentions to other people, and this
helps us to better understand them, especially why they behave in certain ways, and
to assess who are the best social partners (Woodward, 2009). Being able to understand
intentions thus has many advantages in social life. Gauging the goals of others allows
individuals to extract information from the environment and to anticipate the future
behavior of others; for example, when facing a competitor in a novel situation (Call &
Tomasello, 2008; Call, 2009). Are humans alone in being able to read the content of others’
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mind? Or do our closest relatives, the non-human primates, share this ability to represent
other agents’ mental states?
First, we need to define several terms such as ‘goal-directed action’, ‘intentionality’ and
‘intention’ that are commonly used in Theory of Mind research but rarely defined in the
literature. On the one hand, a goal-directed behavior has been defined as ‘‘predominantly
determined by endogenously generated (and internally represented) goals, rather than
by external stimuli’’ (Pezzulo & Castelfranchi, 2009; p. 559). In this view, such action is
expected to produce desired results—goals—and is guided toward these goals by the
inter-play of prediction, control and monitoring. A goal-directed action would thus imply
knowledge of the causal relationships between actions and their consequences, and a
desire for the expected consequences or goal (De Wit & Dickinson, 2009). On the other
hand, some authors consider goal-directed action as a particular relationship that animate
agents have with objects and environmental states without postulating the existence of
internal goals (Penn & Povinelli, 2009). In this view, nonhuman animals reason on the
basis of perceptual similarity between a given situation and a past one by simply matching
them, without reasoning in terms of causal mechanisms involving unobservable mental
states. Philosophers of mind have defined intentionality as the property that makes all
mental states and events directed toward, or relative to, objects or situations in the world
(Dennett, 1971; Searle, 1983; Brentano, 1995). Intention has been defined as the ‘‘mental
process of steering and controlling actions until the intended goal is achieved’’ (Pezzulo &
Castelfranchi, 2009; p. 562) and as ‘‘a plan of action the organism chooses and commits itself
to in pursuit of a goal’’ (Tomasello & Carpenter, 2005; p. 676). According to Buttelmann
and collaborators (2008a), intentions comprised both a goal - what a person is doing—and
a means chosen to achieve that goal - how she is doing it –and the rational choices of action
plans—why she is doing it in that particular way. This is in accordance with the two levels
of intentions proposed by philosophers: a first, behavioral level named ‘intention in action’
(Searle, 1983) or ‘informative intention’ (Sperber & Wilson, 1995), corresponding to the
expression ‘‘I am doing X’’ (goal), and a second, psychological level labeled ‘prior intention’
(Searle, 1983) or ‘communicative intention’ (Sperber & Wilson, 1995), corresponding to
the expression ‘‘I will do X’’ (rational choice). In this view, the first level of intention that
can be directly perceived through bodily movements causes a second level of intention that
can only be inferred. The intention is thus embedded in action.
The idea that intention is embedded in action is emphasized by the discover of mirror
neurons in macaques’ pre-motor cortex that discharge both when the monkey acts and
observes a similar act done by another individual (e.g., Gallese et al., 1996). This discovery
leads researchers to conclude that these parietal-frontal mirror neurons allow an observing
individual to basically understand the goal of an observed action through behavior
(e.g., Rizzolatti, Fogassi & Gallese, 2001; Gallese, 2007). According to these researchers, the
monkey recognizes the goal of the motor act done by an observed individual because it
knows the outcome of the act it executes. Moreover, Fogassi et al. (2005) showed that many
motor inferior parietal lobule neurons fired during the observation of an act but also just
before the beginning of the subsequent acts specifying the action, that shows that these
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neurons code the observed motor act but also allow the observer to anticipate future acts
and to understand then the agent’s intentions.
Different methodologies have been used in experimental psychology and comparative
ethology to study intention reading abilities. One method frequently used with human
infants concerns imitation. In the Gergely et al. study (Gergely, Bekkering & Király, 2002),
14-month-old children watched an adult turn on a light with her forehead. For half of the
infants, the adult was forced to use this unusual action because her hands were occupied;
the other half of the infants saw the adult displaying the same action despite her hands
being free. When given the unconstrained possibility to act on the light themselves, 69%
of infants re-enacted the head action after watching the hands-free condition whereas
only 21% of infants reproduced the action after watching the hands-occupied condition.
The authors proposed that infants inferred that the head action offered some advantage
if it was used even if the adult’s hands were free. Buttelmann et al. (2007) found a similar
effect in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), suggesting that infants and great apes understand
the rationality of actions (but see Buttelmann et al., 2013 for negative results concerning
imitation in chimpanzees).
A second method often used to test infants and nonhuman primates’ understanding
of intentions is the accidental versus intentional protocol. Carpenter, Akhtar & Tomasello
(1998) showed 14 to 18-month-old infants an adult demonstrating either an intentional
action in which the adult exclaimed: ‘‘There!’’ or an accidental action in which the adult
said: ‘‘Whoops!’’. Following the demonstrations, infants were given the opportunity to
make the action themselves. The authors reported that infants imitated significantly more
intentional than accidental actions, and concluded that they understood something about
people’s intentions. Call & Tomasello (1998) compared discrimination between a human’s
intentional and accidental actions in 2- and 3-year-old children, and older chimpanzees
and orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus). Subjects learned to use the marker shown by the
experimenter as a reliable cue to the location of a food reward in one of three boxes. In
the experiment, the experimenter marked one box intentionally (by deliberating placing
the marker) and one box accidentally (by accidentally dropping the marker). The subjects
were then allowed to select one box. The results showed that the three species significantly
selected the intentionally marked box more often than the accidentally marked one,
suggesting shared sensitivity to the intentional nature of the experimenter’s actions (Call &
Tomasello, 1998). By contrast, Povinelli et al. (1998) found negative results using a similar
paradigm in chimpanzees. Using a slightly different protocol, Wood et al. (2007) reported
that chimpanzees, cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) and rhesus macaques choose
an intentionally targeted container more frequently than an accidentally marked one,
and concluded that these species were able to infer rational and goal-directed actions of
a human. Recently, the same paradigm has been applied to Tonkean macaques (Macaca
tonkeana) and tufted capuchin monkeys (Sapajus apella) but with no evidence that these
monkeys recognized others’ goals (Costes-Thiré et al., 2015).
A third method used to test the attribution of intentions is the unwilling versus unable
paradigm. In the original study using this paradigm (Call et al., 2004), after habitually
feeding chimpanzees through a hole in a Plexiglass wall, the experimenter suddenly stopped
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feeding them because either (i) he did not want to though he still could (unwilling), or (ii)
he wanted to but could not (unable). The authors reported more spontaneous begging and
auditory behaviors, and shorter latencies to leave by the chimpanzees when confronted
with an unwilling compared with an unable experimenter, leading the authors to conclude
that chimpanzees interpreted human actions as goal-directed. Similar results have been
found in human infants from nine months of age (Behne et al., 2005), and in capuchin
monkeys for actions displayed by a human but not those performed by inanimate rods
(Phillips et al., 2009).
Despite differing views (Lurz & Krachun, 2011; Povinelli & Vonk, 2003), numerous
researchers concluded that great apes can read below surface behavior to understand
something about the goals, perceptions and intentions of others (Tomasello & Carpenter,
2005; Tomasello et al., 2005; Call & Tomasello, 2008; Buttelmann, Call & Tomasello, 2008b;
Buttelmann et al., 2012). Studies on monkeys are fewer and evidence of Theory of Mind
abilities as intention-reading abilities in these species remains scarce (e.g., Barnes et al.,
2008; Phillips et al., 2009; Drayton & Santos, 2014; see Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990; Povinelli,
Parks & Novak, 1991; Kummer, Anzenberger & Hemelrijk, 1996 for negative results in
macaques and Drayton, Varman & Santos, 2016 for negative results in capuchins). From
this perspective, we investigated understanding of goal-directed actions by adapting a
protocol previously used with human infants (Behne et al., 2005), chimpanzees (Call et
al., 2004), capuchins (Phillips et al., 2009) and African grey parrots (Psittacus erithacus:
Péron et al., 2010) in a little known old world monkey species, the Tonkean macaque. The
literature on this species, and notably on its social cognition, is indeed still scarce, in spite
of its known very tolerant sociality. On the one hand, by testing a non-ape species, we aim
at tracing back the evolutionary history of such characteristics in the primate lineage by
bringing new data on a monkey species. On the other hand, and in a more general way,
studying a tolerant species could bring new light on the effects of sociocultural environment
on cognitive abilities. We tested macaques in three experimental conditions: (i) Unwilling:
the experimenter did not want to give food to the subject; (ii) Unable: the experimenter
could not give food to the subject because of a physical barrier and (iii) Distracted: the
experimenter was manipulating a pebble instead of food. In case that Tonkean macaques
lack the ability to understand human goal-directed actions, they would not discriminate
between the three experimental conditions. Such results would question the idea that
goal-directed actions understanding is a formerly shared trait with at least the common
ancestor we have withmacaques. However, if they are able to track the human goal-directed
actions, as human infants and chimpanzees do, this ability could be shared by our common
ancestor with macaques. In this way, we expected them to behave differently toward a
human who was distracted, unwilling or unable to give them food. More precisely, we
predicted that they would display more gaze alternation between the human and the food
and more agonistic behaviors especially in the ‘Unwilling’ condition compared to the
‘Unable’ and ‘Distracted’ ones. Conversely, we hypothesized that macaques would be less
attentive by looking more elsewhere facing a distracted or unable experimenter than an
unwilling one.
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MATERIALS AND METHODS
Ethical note
The procedures used here adhered to the EUDirective 2010/63/EU for animal experiments.
This experiment was approved by the Animal Experiment Committee of the Centre de
Primatologie de l’Université de Strasbourg and by the CREMEAS Ethics Committee
(Approval for conducting experiments on primates no AL/46/53/02/13).
Subjects
The subjects were fifteen Tonkean macaques (thirteen males aged 3–12 years and two
females aged 6 and 16 years), all born and raised at theCentre de Primatologie de l’Université
de Strasbourg, France. They lived in one of two groups: group A was composed of five adult
males living in multi cage complex of two outdoor areas (14.40+16.00 m2) connected
to two indoor areas (23.78+8.73 m2), and group B contained 26 individuals living in a
2,694 m2 wooded park with access to a 20 m2 indoor housing area. Subjects were tested
between July and August 2015. Their daily diet consisted of commercial pellets and water
ad libitum, and fruits and vegetables twice a week, out of experimental sessions.
Apparatus
Subjects were tested within their social group in an outdoor area situated alongside their
indoor area for groupA and alongside their park for group B. A concrete block (58× 19 cm)
was placed inside the test area perpendicularly to the mesh, about 1 m from the ground,
to be used as a seat by the subject (Fig. 1). In the experimenter area, a table (85 × 50 cm)
was placed in front of the subject. A horizontal opening (64 × 5 cm) in the mesh allowed
subjects to beg for food by extending their hand through the opening. Above the table,
a Plexiglass panel (100 × 60 cm) drilled with a feeding hole (3 cm in diameter, 22.5 cm
above the horizontal opening) doubled the mesh on the experimenter’s side. This small
hole could be easily closed by a pivoting shutter (10 × 6 cm).
Experimental procedure
The experiment required one assistant and one experimenter (CC). Each subject
participated in three different experimental conditions that varied according to the
intentional action of the experimenter:
- Unwilling: the experimenter held a raisin and placed it near the edge of the table out of
the subject’s reach. She then grasped the raisin in one hand and made five explicit back
and forth movements with this hand between her and the feeding hole. Each time her
hand was close to the hole she made five small back and forth movements, preventing
the subject from grabbing the raisin through the hole. The experimenter alternated her
gaze between the raisin and the monkey’s face.
- Unable: the experimenter held a raisin and placed it near the edge of the table out of
the subject’s reach. She then grasped the raisin in one hand and made five explicit back
and forth movements with this hand between her and the feeding hole. However, prior
to the trial, the assistant blocked the hole with the pivoting shutter. The experimenter’s
hand made the same back and forth movements as in Unwilling trials, but striking each
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Figure 1 Picture of the experimental apparatus during a trial of the ‘Unwilling’ condition.
time against the Plexiglass shutter. The experimenter alternated her gaze between the
raisin and the monkey’s face.
- Distracted: The experimenter held a raisin and a pebble and placed both on the table
out of the subject’s reach. She then grasped only the pebble in one hand, leaving the
raisin on the table, and made five explicit back and forth movements with this between
her and the feeding hole. Each time her hand was close to the hole she made five small
back and forth movements. The experimenter alternated her gaze between the pebble
and the monkey’s face.
Six sessions per subject were conducted on a minimum of six different days. One session
was composed of 12 trials including three experimental trials—one for each experimental
condition—and nine motivational trials in which the food was placed on the table and then
given to the subject through the feeding hole when the subject begged. Each experimental
trial lasted about 30 sec and no food was given to the subject at the end of the trial. All
subjects were tested using the same series of motivational and test trials and the order of
presentation of experimental trials was pseudo-randomized across sessions, involving a
session to always begin with two motivational trials in order to motivate the subject to
stay for participating to the experiment. Experimental trials were separated by two or three
motivational trials. The inter-trial interval was about 10 s during which the experimenter
briefly left the experimenter area. Subject participation was voluntary; they were free to
leave the apparatus and testing area at any time.
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Data and reliability analyses
Experiments were recorded by a high-definition video camera (Legria HF S20; Canon,
Tokyo, Japan). Videos were analyzed frame by frame (1 frame = 0.04s) by CC using the
software The Observer XT 10.1.548. For the analysis, we recorded the following behaviors:
- Duration of presence of the subject on the seat
- Duration of gaze elsewhere
- Frequency of gaze alternations between the experimenter and the raisin on the table
and between the experimenter and the item (raisin or pebble) in the hand
- Frequency of begging gestures, i.e., the subject extends an arm through the horizontal
opening of the wire mesh. This was recorded when the extension of the gesture was at
its peak just before the subject began to retract or lower his arm
- Duration of attempting to grasp the item
- Duration of threat towards the experimenter
- Duration of yawn and self-scratch.
For reliability analysis, a random 20% of trials were analyzed by a naïve observer using
The Observer,with a tolerance window of 120ms corresponding to 3 frames. Inter-observer
agreement was excellent for the all the behaviors recorded: presence (Cohen’s κ= 0.86),
grasping attempt (Cohen’s κ = 0.90), gaze elsewhere (Cohen’s κ = 0.89), begging
(Cohen’s κ= 0.90), gaze alternation (Cohen’s κ= 0.88), threat (Cohen’s κ= 0.94) and
yawn and self-scratch (Cohen’s κ= 0.92).
Statistical analysis
Two types of mathematical models were used to determine whether experimental
conditions influenced behavioral measures. First, Generalized Linear Mixed Models
(GLMMs) for count data (i.e., with a Poisson law distribution) were fitted to test which
experimental condition influenced variables including begging gestures and gaze alterna-
tions between the experimenter and the item in the hand. Second, because experimental
trials did not last exactly 30 sec, we established GLMMs for proportional data (by
considering a binomial distribution) in order to test which experimental conditions
influenced continuous variables as the proportion of time spent in the following behaviors:
item grasp attempt, gaze elsewhere, threat, yawn and self-scratch.
In each model, to deal with repeated measures, experimental condition (‘unwilling’;
‘unable’; ‘distracted’) was considered a fixed effect and subject identity was assessed as
a random effect. Tukey corrections were applied when performing multiple comparison
tests between experimental conditions. All models were performed with R 3.1.2’s package
lme4 (Bates et al., 2015), with alpha set at 0.050.
RESULTS
Presence of the subject
Macaques spent more than 95 % of time on the seat in the three experimental conditions
(‘unwilling’ condition: Mean proportion of presence time per trial = 95.79% ± Standard
error of themean= 1.30; ‘distracted’ condition: 95.36%± 1.65; ‘unable’ condition: 95.92%
± 1.79).
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Figure 2 Gaze alternation and looking elsewhere. (A) Mean number of gaze alternations between the
experimenter and her hand holding the item per trial. (B) Mean proportion of time (±standard error of
the mean) macaques looked elsewhere per trial.
Gaze
The frequency of gaze alternations between the experimenter and the item in the
experimenter’s hand (Fig. 2A) was significantly influenced by the experimental condition
(LRT = 25.45; Df = 2; P < 0.0001). GLMM revealed that macaques displayed significantly
more gaze alternation in the ‘unwilling’ (Mean frequency per trial± sem= 5.91±0.49)
than the ‘unable’ condition (5.08±0.39; P = 0.04) and ‘distracted’ condition (4.22±0.40;
P < 0.001). Also, more gaze alternations were detected in the ‘unable’ than ‘distracted’
condition (P = 0.02).
The proportion of looking time elsewhere (Fig. 2B) was significantly influenced
by the experimental condition (LRT = 14535; Df = 2; P < 0.0001). According to
GLMM, macaques looked elsewhere for significantly longer in the ‘unable’ condition
(46.79%± 2.04) than the ‘distracted’ condition (45.52%± 2.41; P < 0.0001); in ‘distracted’
compared with the ‘unwilling’ condition (32.06% ± 2.37; P < 0.0001), and in the ‘unable’
condition compared with the ‘unwilling’ condition (P < 0.0001).
Gestures
The frequency of begging (Fig. 3A) was significantly influenced by the experimental
condition (LRT = 129.15; Df = 2; P < 0.0001). GLMM reported that macaques begged
significantly more in the ‘distracted’ (4.36 ± 0.38) than in the ‘unable’ (2.43 ± 0.26)
and ‘unwilling’ conditions (1.57 ± 0.22; P < 0.0001), and more in the ‘unable’ than the
‘unwilling’ condition (P = 0.0002).
The proportion of time trying to grasp the item through the hole (Fig. 3B) was
significantly influenced by the experimental condition (LRT = 78888;Df = 2; P < 0.0001).
According to GLMM, macaques spent significantly more time attempting to grasp the item
in the ‘unwilling’ condition (34.78% ± 2.26) than in the ‘unable’ (13.94% ± 1.81)
and the ‘distracted’ conditions (5.69% ± 1.41; P < 0.0001). Also, macaques spent
significantlymore time trying to grab the item in the ‘unable’ than the ‘distracted’ condition
(P < 0.0001).
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Figure 3 Begging and grasping attempt.Mean proportion of time (±standard error of the mean) macaques (A) spent begging and (B) attempted
to grasp the item in her hand per trial.
Threat, yawn and self-scratch
The proportion of time threatening (Fig. 4A) was significantly influenced by the
experimental condition (LRT = 1607; Df = 2; P < 0.0001). GLMM reported more threat
behavior towards the experimenter in the ‘unwilling’ condition (0.48% ± 0.17) compared
with the ‘unable’ (0.09%± 0.09) and the ‘distracted’ condition (0.02%± 0.02; P < 0.0001).
Moreover, they spent significantly more time threatening the experimenter in the ‘unable’
than in the ‘distracted’ condition (P < 0.0001).
The proportion of time yawning and self-scratching (Fig. 4B)was significantly influenced
by the experimental condition (LRT = 3173.7; Df = 2; P < 0.0001). GLMM revealed
significantly more time in these behaviors in the ‘distracted’ (4.95% ± 1.01) than the
‘unable’ (2.78%± 0.72) and ‘unwilling’ conditions (2.33%± 0.61; P < 0.0001), and in the
‘unable’ condition compared with the ‘unwilling’ condition (P < 0.0001).
DISCUSSION
We tested Tonkean macaques in the unwilling versus unable paradigm previously used in
parrots (Péron et al., 2010), capuchins (Phillips et al., 2009), chimpanzees (Call et al., 2004)
and human infants (Behne et al., 2005; Marsh et al., 2010). Like these species, Tonkean
macaques behaved as if they understood the intentions of the experimenter, i.e., willing
to give them food or not, as they attempted to grasp the raisin in the experimenter’s hand
significantly more, threatenedmore and were more attentive when she was unwilling rather
than unable to give them food, or was distracted. We report for the first time that Tonkean
macaques act differently according to the goal-directed actions of a human experimenter.
Given that the experimenter displayed exactly the same gestural and visual behaviors in each
experimental condition, our results cannot be explained by a low-level behavior reading.
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Figure 4 Threat, yawn and self-scratch.Mean proportion of time macaques (±standard error of the
mean) spent displaying (A) threat towards the experimenter per trial and (B) yawn and self-scratch per
trial.
Moreover, we observed that Tonkean macaques displayed more frustration behaviors
when facing an unable experimenter than an unwilling one which makes the explanation
that Tonkean macaques simply discriminate environmental variations unlikely. Tonkean
macaques appear thus able to perceive the goals of the experimenter—she is going to
give them food or not. However, we cannot conclude from our experiment that Tonkean
macaques truly understand all aspects of the underlying intentions of the human in a
mentalistic way.
Tonkean macaques displayed significantly more gaze alternation between the
experimenter’s face and hand, threatened more, and tried to grasp the item significantly
more in the ‘unwilling’ than the ‘unable’ and ‘distracted’ conditions, and in the ‘unable’
than the ‘distracted’ condition. Moreover, Tonkean macaques spent more time looking
elsewhere facing a distracted or unable experimenter than an unwilling one showing
a disinterest for the experiment in these conditions. Together, these results indicate
that, in accordance with results in human infants (Behne et al., 2005), chimpanzees (Call
et al., 2004) and rhesus macaques (Wood et al., 2007), but in contradiction to a recent
study in Tonkean macaques (Costes-Thiré et al., 2015), our subjects behaved differently
according to experimental conditions corresponding to different goal-directed actions by
a human experimenter. We can propose two explanations that could explain differences
between Costes-Thiré et al. (2015) study and ours. On the one hand, the ‘unwilling’ versus
‘unable’ paradigm we used miss a communicative dimension: actions performed by
the experimenter are not communicative and macaques do not need to understand the
communicative intent of the action to understand the goal of the experimenter (e.g., I
am going to obtain food). On the contrary, the ‘accidental’ versus ‘intentional’ paradigm
used by Costes-Thiré et al. (2015) has a strong communicative component: subjects have
to understand the experimenter’s communicative intentions (e.g., She is trying to show
me where the food is) to succeed the experiment. That makes the task cognitively more
demanding for macaques than simply inferring the experimenter’s action goal. On the
other hand, our Tonkean macaques had received no training prior to the experiment,
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as in other studies reporting positive results (Behne et al., 2005; Call et al., 2004; Marsh et
al., 2010; Phillips et al., 2009; Wood et al., 2007), and unlike the study reporting negative
results (Costes-Thiré et al., 2015). Moreover, it would be necessary to test our subjects
in many more trials to observe a learning effect; chimpanzees needed hundreds of trials
to discriminate between a human that could and could not see them (Povinelli & Eddy,
1996). Overall, future investigation of a larger sample of individuals would be desirable
to strengthen the validity of our results and to examine more precisely potential learning
effect. It is important to stress that, the experimenter acted in exactly the same way in the
three experimental conditions in terms of gaze alternation and manual movements. From
this perspective, our results cannot be explained by recourse to low-level behavior-reading
based on the topography of the experimenter’s motoric and visual behavior. By contrast,
skeptics could propose that the macaques’ aggressive and gestural behaviors might simply
reflect frustration at not receiving food. Indeed, we reported that Tonkean macaques
threatened significantly more the human experimenter when she was unwilling to give
them food than when she was unable or distracted to do so. This result can be interpreted
as a result of frustration of not obtaining the raisin that is close to reach but also as an
understanding of experimenter’s goal-directed actions. To rule out this explanation in their
study of chimpanzees, Call et al. (2004) ran a non-social control condition in which the
experimenter left the testing area after placing the food on the platform. In this condition
chimpanzees produced fewer behaviors and left the testing area earlier compared to
conditions in which he remained. On the one hand, we recognize that we did not run such
a non-social control, but we previously reported in a comparable non-social condition
that Tonkean macaques and rhesus macaques produced gestures intentionally towards a
human experimenter and pointed significantly less towards food when the experimenter
was absent (Canteloup, Bovet & Meunier, 2015a; Canteloup, Bovet & Meunier, 2015b) that
makes then this explanation unlikely. On the other hand, another way to test for the
frustration hypothesis is to analyze results of frustration behaviors displayed by macaques
as yawning and self-scratching (Maestripieri et al., 1992). If we observe the same pattern
throughout the experimental conditions concerning frustration and agonistic behaviors,
then the frustration explanation could be valuable: macaques could simply perceive that
they are not going to obtain food because of the physical barrier instead of understanding
the underlying goal of the human experimenter. It is interesting to observe completely
reverse results between threats and yawning and self-scratching: Tonkean macaques
displayed then more frustration behaviors when facing an unable experimenter than an
unwilling one which strengthen the explanation that Tonkean macaques perceive the goals
of the human actions.
The Tonkean macaques begged significantly more through the horizontal opening
when the experimenter was distracted rather than when she was unwilling or unable to
give them food, and more when she was unable than unwilling to give them food. The
greater incidence of begging in the ‘distracted’ condition compared with the others might
be related to the raisin being out of reach on the table in this condition, eliciting attempts
to grasp it or to attract the experimenter’s attention towards the food. It appears thus clear
that the macaques understood that the Plexiglass panel was a physical barrier in the ‘unable’
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condition, making the transfer of food impossible. Begging would thus be an alternative
way to attempt to obtain food from a well-intentioned experimenter. These results support
the idea that Tonkean macaques understood that the physical barrier impeded the transfer
of food in the ‘unable’ condition, and that they tried to solve the problem by raising their
arm above the opening.
Contrary to capuchin monkeys (Phillips et al., 2009) and chimpanzees (Call et al.,
2004), Tonkean macaques did not leave the testing area earlier when faced with an
unwilling experimenter. According to those authors, capuchins and chimpanzees appear
sensitive to the experimenter’s intentions when determining how long to wait for food.
However, Tonkean macaques remained present for more than 95 percent of time in the
three experimental conditions. The fact that Tonkean macaques are a highly tolerant
macaque species (Thierry, 2000) could explain why they were so patient, quiet and peaceful
throughout the experiment, in comparison with species more despotic as chimpanzees.
Simple ‘‘presence’’ thus does not appear to be a useful measure of discrimination of
intentional actions in this species. Their social tolerance could also explain the low rates of
threat in the ‘unwilling’ condition.
To sum up, our results add to previous ones reporting that, like great apes, some
monkeys species seem also capable of estimating visual perception of others (Flombaum
& Santos, 2005; Overduin-de Vries, Spruijt & Sterck, 2014; Canteloup, Bovet & Meunier,
2015a; Canteloup, Bovet & Meunier, 2015b; Canteloup et al., 2016) and the intentional
nature of an action (Call et al., 2004; Phillips et al., 2009; Wood et al., 2007). Schmitt,
Pankau & Fischer (2012) revealed using Primate Cognition Test Battery (see Herrmann
et al., 2007 for the initial test in human infants and chimpanzees) that monkeys were not
outperformed by apes. Long-tailed macaques and baboons performed even better than
chimpanzees and orangutans in some of the social cognitive tests. Our ability to assess
mental states of others would not have appeared de novo but would rather be deeply tied to
the evolutionary roots we share with our closest relatives the nonhuman primates. Rochat
and collaborators (2008) reported thatmacaquesmonkeys, as human infants, looked longer
at indirect events, indicating surprise for an unnecessary action and an understanding of
the goal-directedness of actions. In this line, we suggest that Tonkeanmacaques understand
goal-directed actions by perceiving a first level of intention labeled ‘intention in action’
(Searle, 1983) or ‘informative intention’ (Sperber & Wilson, 1995) in the literature, concepts
that are directly perceivable through bodily movements. Indeed, intention is not a unitary
concept but a multi-level one, and evaluation of an individual’s action differs from the
understanding of the individual’s intentions (Call & Tomasello, 2008). Tonkean macaques
seem thus able to understand intentional actions as pursuing goals persistently. According
to Povinelli & Vonk (2003) and their ‘behavioral abstraction hypothesis’, macaques would
form an association between the experimenter’s behavior (food in hand close to me
versus food far from me) and the outcome (obtaining food probable versus obtaining
food improbable). They may learn the rule: <when there is a physical barrier between me
and food, I cannot have access to food>, and not have mentalized: <the experimenter is well
intentioned when trying to give me food but unable because of the physical barrier>. Phillips
et al. (2009) proposed another explanation of their results with capuchins: the monkeys
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might have a set of mechanical principles in mind construing that animate agents can
move on their own, contrary to inanimate objects. This proposition is quite different
from the ‘teleological stance’ adopted by Gergely & Csibra (2003), in which interpreting
goal-directed actions relies on the understanding of efficient action and physical efficiency
of actions of both animate and inanimate agents. Our results fit with several theories as
embodied social cognition proposing that cognitive processes operate on perceptual input
and involve motor representations rather than representation of unobservable mental
states (e.g., Fenici, 2012; Gómez, 1999).
To conclude, we reported that Tonkean macaques behaved as if they understood
the actions and the underlying intentions of an experimenter. Despite the existence of
high-level mindreading explanations (Call & Tomasello, 2008; Dennett, 1971; Dennett,
1987), all the existing findings and ours can also be explained by lower-level explanations
whose behavior-reading hypotheses (Butterfill & Apperly, 2013; Fenici, 2012; Gergely &
Csibra, 2003; Heyes, 2014; Povinelli & Vonk, 2003; see also Meunier, in press for a review).
However, it may be worth re-evaluating the dichotomy between high versus low mental
levels. For example, following Grandin (1995); Grandin (2002); Grandin & Johnson (2004);
Grandin (2009), it might be proposed that nonhuman animals can develop internal
representation of what others see, do etc. not in a language-based way, as humans do, but
rather in a sensory-based way. From this perspective, animals develop a large visual or other
sensory-based data bank in their brain that enables them to project their own experience
to others, to take the visual perspective of others or to discriminate their intentions, not
by thinking in words like normal humans do but rather by thinking in images, similar
to what some autistic persons do (Grandin, 1995; Grandin, 2009). We should reconsider
what ‘‘mentalistic’’ means: is it only linked to human language? Or does a different way of
mentalizing exist, especially for creatures that have no spoken language? These questions
may be valuable for framing future projects by researchers from the Humanities and
Biological Sciences.
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